Does increased enforcement deter criminal organizations from their activities and, more broadly, crime? In recent years, Japan has cracked down on criminal organizations known as the yakuza. Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances (YEO) are third-party policing policies that apply economic sanctions on the yakuza by preventing citizen and corporations from paying off the yakuza. In this paper, we examine intended and unintended effects of YEO. Difference-in-differences estimates show that YEO decrease the number of yakuza members but increase the financial damages of a new type of fraud (money transfer scams). We also find that these effects are stronger in prefectures that are less yakuza infested. These findings are explained as follows. The decrease in yakuza membership inevitably increases the number of former yakuza members, but they are likely to commit profitable crimes because of the absence of other economic opportunities. In addition, our finding that YEO have stronger effects in less yakuza-infested prefectures is consistent with the idea that yakuza syndicates attempt to maintain their advantages against others by maintaining their membership. Therefore, more yakuza members leave their syndicates in less yakuza-infested prefectures, and these former yakuza members engage in quick-buck fraud.
Introduction
Does increased enforcement deter criminal organizations' activities and, more broadly, crime? While the literature on crime deterrence has primarily studied individual crime (Nagin 2013a, b) , a burgeoning literature examines interventions targeting organized crime. These interventions include arresting the leaders of criminal organizations (Dickenson 2014; Vargas 2014) , increasing troops (Dell 2015) , and focused deterrence, which is a problem-oriented policing strategy based on the principles of deterrence theory (Braga et al. 2014; Piehl et al. 2003) . However, the knowledge accumulated in the literature remains scarce. This scarcity does not reduce the importance of regulating criminal organizations; rather, it might reflect the scarcity of data or the difficulty of identifying the effects of crackdowns.
In this paper, we study intended and unintended effects of an intervention directed at Japanese crime syndicates, which are also known as the yakuza. 2 This intervention is, as discussed below, third-party policing, which is police efforts to persuade or coerce third parties (e.g., non-offending persons) to take some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing crime problems (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Mazerolle and Ransley 2006) . To the best of our knowledge, the effect of third-party policing of organized crime has hardly been in academic research.
Yakuza business is largely concerned with illegal activities. In 1989, the National Police Agency (henceforth, NPA) of Japan published estimates for total yakuza income of 1.3 trillion yen ($11.8 billion dollars). This figure is underestimated however; it excludes income derived from yakuza links with big business (Hill 2003) . Yakuza sources of income, known as shinogi, include a range of unambiguously illegal activities. The activities include illegal gambling and drug dealing, especially of methamphetamine. The yakuza also earn money from providing protection and extra-legal fixing (for both legitimate and illegitimate businesses).
In spite of these illegal activities, it is not illegal to organize or join yakuza syndicates in Japan, unlike in many other countries. Due to the unique (legal) status of the yakuza, the police are able to keep track of the actual conditions-for example, the number of members-of yakuza syndicates. Using the data published by the police, we evaluate the impact of a crackdown on yakuza syndicates.
Law enforcement has recently cracked down on the yakuza. Of particular interest are Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances (YEO). YEO are third-party policing policies. Capabilities for monitoring criminal acts are limited when only the police are involved in crime control and prevention but could be improved if third parties (e.g., non-yakuza citizens) are also engaged. Non-yakuza citizens and corporations are prohibited, for example, from receiving protection services from yakuza members. They cannot serve food and drink, rent rooms, or sign insurance contracts with members. Contravening corporations risk their names being revealed to the public and losing their public credibility. The purpose of YEO is to cut off the flow of funding to the yakuza in order to weaken their power.
YEO appear to be effective in reducing total yakuza membership, as shown in Figure 1 , where membership is reported in December of each year. 3 However, this does not necessarily mean that YEO help improve public security. A sharp reduction in yakuza membership produces a corresponding increase in the number former yakuza members who have recently left syndicates. In this paper, we ask, where have they gone? We argue that they are more likely to commit paying crimes, since they may have difficulty finding legitimate economic opportunities. In fact, some former members cannot find (legitimate) jobs due to their criminal records, their lack of human capital, the stigma attached to the yakuza, among other factors, and they often engage in fraud (NHK 2014) . In the quotation at the beginning of this section, Shinobu Tsukasa, the leader of the largest yakuza syndicate, Yamaguchi-gumi, raised a similar concern. However, to the best of our knowledge, this idea has never been empirically examined.
YEO may also have made current yakuza members more likely to commit profitable crimes they did not often commit. Since YEO eliminate existing sources of income, current yakuza members might need to find other sources.
We use a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach to study the effects of YEO. Since YEO are prefecture-level policies, the enactment dates vary across prefectures. We exploit this variation to identify the effects of YEO. Before studying the effects on crime, we examine the impact on yakuza syndicates, specifically on total yakuza membership. As shown in Figure 1 , the YEO appear to have decreased membership, but a naïve before and after comparison may fail to correctly isolate the effects of the YEO enactment. We thus begin by providing empirical evidence of these effects.
To assess the effects of YEO, it is important to capture the heterogeneity of yakuza Criminal organizations endeavor to achieve control over the illegal markets, in which they are active; this characteristic is exclusivity or, to use a more focused term, monopoly (Schelling 1971 (Schelling , 1980 . Indeed, yakuza syndicates often fight against others. The extent of yakuza activity varies across prefectures. Many yakuza syndicates are active in some prefectures, while only one is active in others. To maintain power, yakuza syndicates try to prevent their members from resigning, often by resorting to violence (Hill 2003) . Based on game-theoretic insights, we argue that yakuza syndicates attempt to keep their membership in more yakuza-infested prefectures. To capture the heterogeneity of yakuza activities, we construct yakuza concentration indices at the prefectural level and incorporate them into our DiD models. We find that YEO decrease total yakuza membership and that they are more effective in decreasing membership in less yakuza-infested prefectures. Notice that this result is consistent with the idea that yakuza syndicates have stronger incentives to maintain their membership in yakuza-infested areas.
Next, we study the effects of YEO on crimes. In particular, we are interested in money transfer scams, also known as phone or communications fraud. The number of cases, as well as the total financial damages, of this type of fraud have been increasing in Japan, and these activities are so profitable that they accounted for nearly one-half of all financial damages from property crime in 2014. We show that YEO neither increase nor decrease the number of money transfer scams. Nor do they change the number of violent crimes (e.g., murders and robberies) or other property crimes (e.g., burglaries). However, we find that YEO increase the total financial damages of money transfer scams and that this effect is stronger in less yakuza-infested prefectures.
As stated above, we argue that both former and current yakuza members are more likely to engage in profitable wrongdoing in the presence of YEO. To explore this idea, we conduct supplementary analyses. First, we show that the increment in financial damages from money transfer scams is positively correlated with the decrement in yakuza membership, which is considered to approximate the number of yakuza dropouts. Second, using another dataset, we find that YEO increase the number of yakuza members arrested for fraud but do not change those for many other crimes. The results of this study yield novel policy implications for the promotion of public safety. On the one hand, YEO decrease yakuza membership, and this effect is negatively correlated with the yakuza concentration index values. The first result suggests that third-party policing can be an effective countermeasure against organized crime, while the second result suggests that it may be more effective to attack a specific group intensively (rather than many groups). This is because when a group's membership shrinks, other groups will not expend much effort to maintain their membership, as competition has relaxed. On the other hand, YEO increase profitable crime. The promotion of public safety demands the rehabilitation of former yakuza members. Furthermore, rehabilitation assistance is expected to encourage current yakuza members to leave their syndicates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on organized crime interventions, while Section 3 provides a background on the yakuza and recent crackdowns on them, especially through YEO. Section 4 describes data and empirical strategies. Section 5 provides the results, and Section 6 examines their robustness. Section 7 concludes.
Organized Crime Interventions
While the majority of the literature on crime deterrence examines interventions to address individual crime, a burgeoning literature considers organized crime interventions and how they affect violence.
A branch of this literature suggests that direct interventions, such as removing the leaders of criminal groups and increasing the presence of police or troops, can produce adverse effects. Dickenson (2014) finds that removing leaders increases homicide in Mexico, arguing that competition among actors to succeed in a criminal organization encourages them to exploit violence in the absence of a leader. In a similar vein, Phillips (2014) argues that in the context of the Mexican drug war, leadership removal causes groups to fragment, but as newer groups emerge due to market demands, violence increases in the long run. Examining gangs in the U.S., Vargas (2014) finds that as adjacent gangs compete for turf, violence temporarily increases when a gang leader is arrested but is not replaced by another leader. Dell (2015) shows that in the Mexican drug war, a crackdown with increased troop presence increases drug trade-related violence. Her evidence suggests that the violence occurs as rival drug traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories from incumbents whose power is weakened by the crackdown. These studies suggest that the adverse effects of direct interventions are likely greater in more competitive regions or where market demands are high.
Another branch of the literature reports the effectiveness of an intervention called focused deterrence. It is a problem-oriented policing strategy based on the principles of deterrence theory. For instance, Boston's Operation Ceasefire aimed to reduce gangrelated violence by working with an interagency group including law enforcement, social services, and community practitioners, communicating with targeted offenders and developing legal sanctions for the use of violence (Kennedy 1997) . The evidence shows that Boston's Operation Ceasefire reduced violence significantly (Phiehl et al. 2003; Braga et al. 2014) .
We contribute to the literature on intervention targeting organized crime by examining both intended and unintended consequences of an indirect intervention, thirdparty policing. This is a policing practice that persuades or coerces non-offending third parties to take responsibility for crime control and prevention (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Mazerolle and Ransley 2006) . Specifically, we study YEO that prevent citizens and corporations from associating with the yakuza. We show that third-party policing was effective in reducing the number of yakuza members. The YEO thus achieved the intended goal, but we probe into the likely unintended consequences. We argue that although, or rather because, the membership of yakuza syndicates decreased, some kinds of property crime increased (in terms of the financial damages). Yakuza dropouts may struggle to find economic opportunities and can be incentivized to commit profitable crimes.
Background
In this section, we review the Japanese organized crime syndicates known as the yakuza. Subsequently, we discuss YEO.
Japanese Organized Crime Syndicates: the Yakuza
In this subsection, we provide background information about yakuza syndicates that will help explain our research design. We do not provide a comprehensive summary; see, for example, Hill (2003) for such an overview.
The yakuza, also called Bōryoku-dan (violence groups), are infamous for their illegal activities. Despite this, it is not illegal to organize or join yakuza syndicates in Japan, unlike in many other countries. Legal restrictions, however, have been imposed on (NPA 2014) . Approximately 96% of total membership is from designated yakuza syndicates, and this ratio does not change over the period examined in this study (NPA 2009 and . In addition, the largest three yakuza syndicates-the Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai, and Sumiyoshi-kai-represent roughly 77% of total designated yakuza membership. In particular, the Yamaguchi-gumi has 36, 400 members and operates in forty-five of forty-seven prefectures. Table 1 summarizes the number of prefectures in which each designated yakuza syndicate is active. 4 In this paper, we focus on designated yakuza syndicates, since they represent the largest share of total membership, and data on the yakuza are usually restricted to designated syndicates. Henceforth, we will refer to these designated yakuza syndicates as simply yakuza syndicates.
As mentioned above, it is not illegal to join a yakuza syndicate in Japan. This feature helps the police keep the track of total yakuza membership. Specifically, when a member resigns from a yakuza syndicate, he submits his resignation to the police; often, the yakuza syndicate also notifies the police. Importantly, the member is willing to do so. In fact, members often ask the police for help when they resigns.
The described conditions of the yakuza syndicates provide us with a unique opportunity to examine the effects of increased enforcement on organized crime. Members of criminal organizations are underground in many countries because of their illegal status, but members of the yakuza need not hide themselves.
Sources of Income
Yakuza syndicates operate illegal gambling houses and brothels and sell illegal drugs, such as methamphetamine. In addition, they lend money at illegal interest rates and collect loan payments from borrowers through threats of or actual violence. The yakuza commit not only domestic crimes but also transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering. 5 Yakuza syndicates provide extra-state protection services to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses, including bars and restaurants. They also extort protection fees (mikajime-ryō) from customers through violence or threats. Similarly, they earn money by helping resolve problems for non-yakuza citizens. Indeed, non-yakuza citizens may ask the yakuza to do so, especially when it is costly to settle the problem legally (Milhaupt and West 2000) . Finally, they force business owners to rent supplies, such as houseplants and towels, at high prices.
Yakuza Concentration
As stated in Schelling (1980) , a criminal organization endeavors to achieve monopolistic control of the illegal markets in which it is active, and this exclusivity is in the nature of organized crime. To take into account the possibility of conflicts between yakuza syndicates, we examine the extent of concentration of (different) yakuza syndicates.
The extent of yakuza activity varies across prefectures. Specifically, the number of yakuza syndicates in one prefecture varies from one to seven. Data are available not only on the number of (different) yakuza syndicates in each prefecture but also on the membership of each yakuza syndicate. Using these data, we construct a yakuza concentration index at the prefectural level, which is defined in Section 4. These indices are illustrated in Figure 2 , where darker red indicates greater concentration. Figure 2 indicates that the extent of yakuza concentration is regionally clustered. In other words, prefectures in darker (lighter) red are typically surrounded by other prefectures in darker (lighter) red. This observation can be explained using terminology from game theory as the strategic complementarity of yakuza conflicts (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985) . Following Schelling (1980) , consider yakuza syndicates as agents endeavoring to achieve monopolistic control over the illegal markets. To strengthen their powers over the markets, the yakuza choose their membership strategically. Likewise, firms choose their labor force strategically in economics. In this situation, yakuza syndicates are considered to have incentives to increase (decrease) their membership if their rivals increase (decrease) their membership. Game theorists refer to this environment as a game with strategic complementarity. It is well known that strategic complementarity causes multiplicity of Nash equilibria. This multiplicity offers an explanation for why the yakuza concentration index values are not uniform throughout Japan (i.e., why some areas are redder than others).
Third-party Policing: the Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances
Law enforcement efforts to control the yakuza have recently increased, of which YEO are of particular interest. YEO are third-party policing practices, which represent police efforts to persuade or coerce non-offending persons (i.e., third parties) to take some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing crime problems (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Mazerolle and Ransley 2006 ). An advantage of third-party policing may be improved monitoring capabilities. The police have a limited ability to monitor criminals due to restricted resources, but by persuading or coercing citizens, communities, and corporations into taking part in crime control and prevention efforts, the density of actors who control and prevent crime increases.
Mazerolle, Higginson, and Eggins (2013) characterize third-party policing based on the following four components: (i) third parties; (ii) legal lever; (iii) crime or disorder problems; and (iv) the nature of the partnership. YEO meet all of them: (i) the third parties are respectable citizens and corporations; (ii) they are obliged to not be associated with yakuza members; (iii) YEO target yakuza syndicates; and (iv) the third parties are willing to obey the rules; otherwise, they may be penalized. Specifically, YEO burden respectable citizens and corporations. These third parties are prohibited from providing the yakuza with any payoffs. For example, they are banned from paying venue fees or protection fees, as well as from renting rooms to yakuza members, allowing them to create bank accounts, and serving them food and drink. Corporations found to be in contravention risk their names being revealed to the public and thus risk losing their public credibility. Moreover, they may be subject to imprisonment or fines for violating YEO. The purpose of YEO is to cut off the flow of funding to yakuza syndicates. As prefecture-level ordinances, YEO differ slightly from prefecture to prefecture, but they are nevertheless essentially the same: all the YEO rely on third-party policing. As stated above, yakuza members have difficulty maintaining their (illegal) businesses under YEO, thereby suffering financial losses.
Intended and Unintended Effects of YEO
YEO appear to be effective in reducing yakuza membership (Figure 1 ), but we argue that YEO may have public safety side effects. The sharp reduction of yakuza membership inevitably increases the number of former yakuza members. However, former members might be likely to commit profitable crimes, as they face difficulties finding legitimate economic opportunities even after leaving yakuza syndicates. In fact, some former yakuza members cannot find (legitimate) jobs, and they often become involved in fraud (NHK 2014) . This concern is raised by Shinobu Tsukasa, the leader of the Yamaguchi-gumi (Sankei Shimbun 2011), as well as by Mizoguchi (2012 Mizoguchi ( , 2013 , who points out the danger of the non-yakuza groups that emerge when yakuza syndicates weaken (e.g., Kantō-rengō and Dragon).
In addition, current yakuza members should be more likely to commit profitable crime after the enactment of YEO, since the YEO increase the difficulty of exploiting citizens and corporations in the traditional ways described in the previous subsection.
Heterogeneity in the Effects of YEO
We expect that the effects of YEO vary with the extent of yakuza concentration. A reduction of membership is disadvantageous to yakuza activities, including in conflicts with other syndicates. This is especially true in prefectures that are more yakuzainfested; thus, a yakuza syndicate attempts to maintain its power. In fact, yakuza syndicates reward and punish their members to maintain order within their organizations (Hill 2003) . We argue that a yakuza syndicate may have weaker incentives to maintain its membership in prefectures with less yakuza concentration because of the lower risk of a conflict with another syndicate. It is therefore expected that YEO effects are stronger in less yakuza-infested prefectures, since more yakuza dropouts may struggle to find economic opportunities and are thus more likely to commit profitable crimes.
Enactment Dates of YEO
As YEO are prefecture-level ordinances, their enactment dates vary across prefectures. The enactment dates are summarized in Table 2 . 6 A major idea of our research design is to identify the effects of YEO by incorporating variation in the enactment dates into a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model.
Data and Empirical Strategies
In this section, we first explain our datasets and then review our estimation methods.
Data
Five datasets are used. The first and second cover the yakuza syndicates. An important reference is the NPA annual reports on yakuza syndicates (Bōryoku-dan Jōsei). The third and fourth datasets cover crime. The fifth is concerns treatment and control variables.
Transition of Yakuza Membership
Although the NPA reports total yakuza membership every year (Figure 1 ), it does not report prefecture-level data. After requesting these data from prefectural police departments, we obtained data for thirty-seven of forty-seven prefectures. As mentioned in Section 3, the police are able to track yakuza membership, since a yakuza member submits his resignation to the police when he leaves the syndicate. We obtained yearly prefecture-level panel data and then impute monthly values for annual data using linear interpolation.
Yakuza Concentration Index
We augment our analysis by taking into account potential conflicts among yakuza syndicates. Specifically, we construct prefecture-level concentration indices for (different) yakuza syndicates. To do so, we need yakuza distribution across all forty-seven prefectures, as well as the number of members in each syndicate. As mentioned above, the number of (different) yakuza syndicates in a prefecture varies across prefectures. Since the data on the yakuza distribution do not appear in reports on the syndicates, we use the data provided by the NPA. The NPA also tracks the number of members in each yakuza syndicate. Summarizing the provided data and constructing a dataset of yakuza distribution, we construct yakuza concentration indices, which we define analogously to HerfindahlHirschman indices. To do so, we calculate the "share" of each yakuza syndicate in each prefecture. Letting G be the set of twenty-one yakuza syndicates listed in Table  1 , s pg denotes the share of yakuza syndicate g ∈ G in prefecture p, where this share is defined in the next paragraph. Given the shares, the yakuza concentration index in prefecture p is defined by:
Note that YCI p increases with the number of yakuza syndicates operating in prefecture p. In particular, it is zero if there is only one yakuza syndicate.
One difficulty encountered in computing the concentration indices is determining the share s pg . No data are available on the distributions of each yakuza syndicate's members across prefectures, and thus, they must be estimated. To estimate them, we assume that yakuza members are distributed proportionally to the population of prefectures in which the yakuza syndicate operates. Note that 0 ≤ s pg ≤ 1 and ∑ g s pg = 1 for any p and g (since there is at least one yakuza syndicate in all prefectures).
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate the distributions under different assumptions later. We assume that yakuza members are equally distributed across the prefectures in which the yakuza syndicate operates or that they are distributed proportionally to the population density in these prefectures.
Money Transfer Scams
Money transfer scams, also known as phone or communications fraud, have been recently increasing in Japan. This kind of fraud is so profitable that it accounted for nearly one-half of financial damages from all property crimes in 2014. We obtain data on money transfer scams from the NPA, which is provided as prefecture-level monthly panel data covering the period from 2011 to 2013. It includes both the number of reported cases and the financial damages. Because of this data restriction, the treatment dummy variables for the YEO enactment are constant in four prefectures in which YEO were enacted before 2011 (Ehime, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Kagoshima). See Table 2.
Traditional Violent and Property Crime
We use the statistical data on crime (Hanzai Tokei Shiryō) published by the NPA. This dataset contains the number of reported crimes for overall violent and property crimes, which we refer to as traditional crime. Overall violent crime is an aggregate variable including murder, robbery, arson, rape, abduction, human trafficking and sexual assault, while overall property crime includes burglary, motor vehicle theft, snatching, and pickpocketing. It provides monthly data from 2008 to 2013.
Treatment and Control Variables
YEO are the treatment variable of interest. In our research design, we identify the effects of YEO by exploiting variation in the YEO enactment dates across prefectures ( Table 2) . As stated below, this treatment variable, denoted YEO pt , is equal to 1 if YEO is enacted in prefecture p at time t and 0 otherwise. 7
Observable control variables are imputed monthly with linear interpolation, and the following are included: proportion of males; proportion aged 15-24, proportion aged 25-34; proportion aged over 65; proportion of foreign people; unemployment rates; and GDP. These data are publicly available from e-Stat (an official statistics website for Japan). Summary statistics are given in Panel A of the Appendix.
Empirical Strategies
We estimate a regression model of the effects of YEO on yakuza membership and crime. We apply a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model to identify the effects of YEO.
Baseline Model without the Yakuza Concentration
We start with a baseline model that ignores the yakuza concentration:
where y pt denotes the logarithm of the outcome variable-yakuza membership in Subsection 5.1 or the number of cases or financial damages of a crime in Subsections 5.2 to 5.4-in prefecture p at time t. YEO pc are treatment dummies in prefecture p. Specifically, YEO pt = 1 after the YEO enactment; YEO pt = 0 before enactment. X pt is a vector of control variables listed in Panel A in Appendix. µ p are prefecture fixed effects capturing the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of prefecture p, such as the yakuza culture and attitudes toward them. ξ t are time (month times year) fixed effects. ∑ r∈R δ pr ρ r t captures region-specific time trends that account for regional variation in unobserved heterogeneity. In this study, Japan is divided into seven regions (Hokkaido-Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu-Okinawa), represented in set R. δ pr are region dummies. Specifically, δ pr = 1 if prefecture p belongs to region r; δ pr = 0 otherwise. ρ r are regionspecific time trends. Every prefecture is contained in one of the regions. ε pt denotes the idiosyncratic errors. All regressors are weighted by the prefecture population. There are two reasons for incorporating region-specific time trends into our DiD model. First, we consider the possibility that yakuza members migrate from prefectures where YEO are enacted to others where they are not. Second, as illustrated in Figure 2 , yakuza concentration appears to be regionally clustered.
Throughout this study, we use prefecture-level clustered standard errors in order to adjust for serial correlation within the same prefecture (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) .
Main Model with the Yakuza Concentration
We augment our analysis by taking into account the yakuza concentration. In the literature on causal inference, the importance of treatment heterogeneity has been recognized (Morgan and Winship 2007, 2014; Sampson, Winship and Knight 2013) , and our study is no exception, since the extent of yakuza activity varies across prefectures. Our main DiD model is then as follows:
In this model, we include an interaction term YEO pt × YCI p to capture heterogeneity in YEO. YCI p is the yakuza concentration index in prefecture p, which is defined in Subsection 4.1. We calculate the index using data on the yakuza distribution prior to the enactment of YEO for two reasons. First, YCI in prefecture p may change if yakuza members migrate from a prefecture where YEO are enacted to another where they are not. Second, calculating the index using data from before YEO enactment can partially alleviate concerns about reversal causality-that is, from yakuza membership to the yakuza concentration. Finally, notice that a non-interaction term YCI p is not included in model (2). As the value of YCI hardly varies over time, it is almost parallel to the prefecture fixed effect µ p ; therefore, model (2) would be affected by multicollinearity if YCI p were included in the model. 8
Results
In this section, we provide the empirical results of the above estimation. We first discuss the impacts of YEO on yakuza membership, followed by the effects on crime. Subsequently, we conduct further analyses and find evidence that both former and current yakuza members engage in money transfer scams.
Effects of YEO on Yakuza Membership
To estimate the effects of YEO on yakuza membership, we substitute the logarithm of the number of yakuza members per 100,000 inhabitant in equations (1) and (2) as the dependent variable y pt . Our estimation results are summarized in Table 3 .
In Columns (1) to (3), we report our estimates based on the baseline model (1). The estimated coefficients of YEO are negative, but they are not statistically significant. In Columns (4) to (6), we report our estimates based on the main model (2). We do not include region-specific trends in Column (4), whereas we include region-specific linear and quadratic trends in Columns (5) and (6), respectively. In each specification, YEO by itself has a significant negative effect-that is, the estimated β 1 is significant and negative. In particular, the estimated effect is greater in specifications with regionspecific time trends.
The interaction term YEO pt × YCI p has a positive effect-that is, the estimated β 2 is significant and positive-in Columns (4) to (6). This result states, consistent with our expectation, that yakuza membership is less likely to decrease in prefectures with more yakuza concentration.
The prefecture-level total effect of YEO is given by:
and the nation-level total effect is obtained by substituting the nationwide yakuza concentration index for YCI p in the above expression. Using this formula, we find that YEO help reduce yakuza membership by approximately 11 to 16% and that YEO account for approximately 40% of the recent reduction.
Effects of YEO on Crime
Next, we examine the effects of YEO on crime. In particular, we consider the number of cases and the total financial damages of money transfer scams, as well as the number of traditional violent and property crimes.
Money Transfer Scams
We first examine the effects of YEO on the number of cases of money transfer scams and then consider the total financial damages. Our estimation results are summarized in Table 4 . First, we examine the effects of YEO on the number of cases of money transfer scams. In this regression, the dependent variable y pt is the logarithm of the number of fraud cases per 100,000 inhabitants. 9 As shown in Columns (1) to (6), the estimated coefficient of YEO pt is not statistically significant in either the baseline or the main model. YEO thus neither increases nor decreases the number of cases of money transfer scams. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of YEO pt × YCI p does not have a significant effect, as shown in Columns (4) to (6). This result suggests that YEO do not change the number of cases of money transfer fraud.
Second, we examine the effects of YEO on the total financial damages of money transfer scams. In this regression, the dependent variable y pt is the logarithm of the financial damages. In Columns (7) and (9), we report our estimates based on the baseline model (1) in which heterogeneity in yakuza activity across prefectures is ignored. Note that the estimated coefficients of YEO are not statistically significant.
However, a different picture appears when we take into account heterogeneity in yakuza activity across prefectures. In Columns (10) to (12), we report the estimates based on the main model (2). YEO pt has a positive effect (i.e., the estimated β 1 is significant and positive), and YEO pt × YCI p has a negative effect (i.e., the estimated β 2 is significant and negative). This evidence suggests that YEO increase the total amount of financial damages, but the rate of increase is smaller in prefectures with grater yakuza concentration. For the whole of Japan, YEO are thought to have increased the total financial damages by roughly 40 to 55%. 10 In Japan, total damages form money transfer scams have grown by more than 150% from 2011 to 2013. According to our evidence, roughly 30% of this recent growth is attributable to the enactment of YEO. Our findings are consistent with the NPA's view that the methods and techniques of money transfer scams have become sophisticated in recent years (NPA 2015) , and they suggests that skillful criminals are capable of extracting large amounts of money. Finally, these two effects on yakuza membership and on the financial damages of money transfer scams are consistent with each other. YEO decrease the number of yakuza members, which necessarily produces many yakuza dropouts; however, they considered likely to commit quick-buck crimes, such as money transfer scams, as their economic opportunities are very limited. We argue that the financial damages of money transfer scams have increased because of rather than despite the decrease in yakuza membership.
Traditional Crime
Next, we study the effects of YEO on traditional crimes, that is property crimes (the sum of burglary, motor vehicle theft, snatching, and pickpocketing cases) and violent crimes (the sum of murder, robbery, arson, rape, abduction, human trafficking and sexual assault cases). To do so, we substitute the logarithm of the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants into the dependent variable y pt . In Table 5 , we report the estimated effects of YEO on traditional crime. As shown in this table, YEO do not (statistically significantly) increase or decrease the number of traditional crimes in any specification; in addition, YEO pt × YCI p does not have a significant effect.
Notice that a similar pattern is found in Columns (1) to (6) of Table 4 (for our analysis of the effect of YEO on the number of money transfer scams). We find no evidence that YEO increase or decrease the incidence of any of the crimes we investigate.
Who Commits Money Transfer Scams?
A natural question to ask is who commits money transfer scmas in the presence of YEO. As mentioned above, we argue that former yakuza members may do so. Since YEO financially damage yakuza syndicates, current yakuza members also may engage in money transfer scams. In this subsection, we offer empirical evidence suggesting that both current and former members commit this profitable crime. 11
Former Yakuza Members
Former yakuza members struggle to find economic opportunities due to their criminal records and lack of human capital and the stigma attached to yakuza membership, among other factors. We have shown that YEO effectively reduce yakuza membership. A testable implication is that the increment of yakuza dropouts is associated with an observed increase in money transfer scams. We use the following reduced-form regression model:
where y pt is the logarithm of the total financial damages, ∆ ln Yakuza pt is the firstdifference of the logarithm of yakuza membership, and ∆ ln Yakuza pt−1 and ∆ ln Yakuza pt−2 are the first-and second-lagged variables of ∆ ln Yakuza pt , respectively. These variables allow us to capture the dynamic effects of the increment in yakuza dropouts. The reason we add these lagged variables is that former yakuza members may start engaging in this crime after they leave their syndicates. This time lag is captured by the lagged variables. We report the estimation results in Table 6 . The estimated coefficient of ∆ ln Yakuza pt is not statistically significant, but those of ∆ ln Yakuza pt−1 and ∆ ln Yakuza pt−2 are statistically significant and negative. These negative estimates mean that as yakuza membership decreases, financial damages increase. Finally, since only the lagged variables are significant, it is suggested that the decrease in yakuza membership increased money transfer scams, albeit with delays. Note: The following are included as control variables: proportions of males; those aged 15-24, 25-34, and older than 65; and foreign residents, as well as the unemployment rate and GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1
Current Yakuza Members
It is also possible that current yakuza members commit profitable crime because YEO financially damage the yakuza. To test this hypothesis, we use another dataset because we cannot determine which money transfer scam is committed by (current) yakuza members using the dataset from the previous analysis. To overcome this difficulty, we use data on the arrests of yakuza members in Tokyo. That is, we use the number of arrests of (current) yakuza members for fraud as a proxy measure of yakuza member involvement in money transfer scams. Arrest data may reflect the (unobservable) level of law enforcement, and there may be an endogeneity problem in using this proxy. However, as stated below, this endogeneity problem is not considered serious. First, since YEO are by nature third-party policing laws, the (unobservable) level of law enforcement is not thought to greatly affect the number of arrests. Second, if YEO resulted in increased law enforcement, then the number of arrests for crimes other than fraud would also have increased; however, as shown in Subsection 6.1, this number does not increase. This suggests that the (unobservable) level of law enforcement does not vary with the introduction of YEO.
We use ward-level data on the arrests of (current) yakuza members for fraud. To construct this dataset, we aggregate police station-level data. This dataset is published annually by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, and it covers the period from 2004 to 2013. It is thus possible to construct ward-level data from 2004 to 2013, but we restrict our sample to the period from 2009 to 2013 in order to identify the effects of YEO. Specifically, a policy against money transfer scams was introduced in 2008. The number of cases of money transfer fraud decreased sharply just after the launch of this policy. To isolate this effect from the impact of YEO, we only use data from after 2009. 12 Our research design is similar to interrupted time-series analysis. Since our arrests are count data, we use poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation. The advantage of PPML estimation is its robustness to misspecification (Wooldridge 2002; Tenreyro 2006, 2011) . We set up our regression model as follows:
where
is the expected value of y wy conditional on YEO y and X wy . y wy are the number of arrests of (current) yakuza members in ward w in year y, and YEO y indicate whether YEO was enacted in Tokyo. X wy are the observed control variables, including a proportion of males, average age, a proportion of those older than 65, a proportion of foreign residents, and taxable income. We obtain these data from the Tokyo Statistical Yearbook, and the summary statistics are given in Panel C of the Appendix. µ w are ward-level fixed effects, ξ y are year fixed effects, and ε wy are idiosyncratic error terms. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level.
We report the estimated effect of YEO on the the number of arrests of (current) yakuza members for fraud-the estimated β-at the top of Figure 3 . Similarly, we estimate the effect of YEO on other kinds of crime by substituting the number of arrests of (current) yakuza members for arrests for other kinds of crime-methamphetamine (use and distribution), property crime or violent crime-into y wy . As is clear in this figure, YEO increase the number of arrests for fraud, but they do not increase, or rather decreased, the number of arrests for other kinds of crime. 
Assessing Alternative Channels
As shown above, the magnitude of YEO effects are small in prefectures with greater yakuza concentration. We argue that yakuza syndicates should attempt to maintain their power in these areas and discourage their members from resigning. However, some readers may argue that illegal markets in such areas are more profitable. In other words, due to high demand for illegal goods, there are plenty of economic opportunities for yakuza members, and thus, they are capable of earning money, which in turn reduces their likelihood to resign in such areas. To assess the validity of this channel, we examine the relationship between the yakuza concentration index values and the number of the arrests for methamphetamine (use and distribution). Methamphetamine is an illegal but commonly abused drug in Japan; 77 percent of all drug arrests in 2008 were related to methamphetamine. Yakuza syndicates are largely involved in smuggling and distributing it throughout Japan. It is said that yakuza syndicates earn considerable sums of money from this profitable business.
In addition, a police presence may deter yakuza activity. An increase in the number of police officers may discourage crimes committed by both former and current yakuza members. Police presence may thus explain variation in the effects of YEO. We assess the validity of this channel by examining the relationship between our yakuza congestion index and the number of police officer per 1,000 inhabitants. 
where z py are either the number of methamphetamine arrests per 100,000 inhabitants or the number of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants. X py are control variables: proportion of males; proportions of those aged 15-24, 25-34, and older than 65; and proportions of foreign residents, as well as the unemployment rate and GDP. µ p are prefecture fixed effects, γ y are year fixed effects, and ε py are idiosyncratic error terms. Our estimates are reported in Table 7 . There is no statistically significant relationship between the number of methamphetamine arrests rates and yakuza concentration or between the number of police officer per 1,000 inhabitants and yakuza concentration. 13 These results provide evidence that these suggested channels are not plausible.
Robustness Check
In this section, we demonstrate the robustness of our empirical results. 13 Note that simultaneous bias may arise when estimating these relationships. As a robustness check, we also estimate a model using a dynamic panel approach that addresses simultaneous bias using lagged instruments (Arellano and Bond 1991), and we obtain qualitatively similar results.
Placebo Tests of the Effects of YEO
A possible endogeneity problem is that the (early) introduction of YEO might reflect public concern about high levels of yakuza activity. Thus, we add variables capturing one-, two-, or three-month leads for YEO enactment to the main specification (2). The coefficients of these lead variables should not be close to zero if the (early) introduction of YEO is spurred by concerns about public security.
Our estimates are reported in Table 8 . Specifically, we estimate the effects of YEO on yakuza membership in Columns (1)- (3) and on total financial damages from money transfer scams in Columns (4)-(6). As shown in Columns (1)- (3), none of coefficients on the lead variables is statistically significant, which indicates that the reduction in yakuza membership is not caused by the downward trend. Similarly, as shown in Columns (4)-(6), the increase in the financial damages from money transfer scams is not caused by the upward trend. Taken together, these results provide benchmark evidence that the effects of YEO on the extent of yakuza membership and the financial damages of money transfer scams can be interpreted as causal.
Robustness Check
Next, we conduct a variety of robustness checks. Table 9 reports the results of the robustness check of the analysis of yakuza membership; similarly, Table 10 reports the results of the robustness check of the analysis of the financial damages from money transfer scams.
Column (1)-(2): Alternative Definitions of YCI. We observe robustness to the definition of the yakuza concentration index YCI p . Recall that we need to compute the share s pg of yakuza syndicate g in prefecture p. In the main model, we assume that members of yakuza syndicate g are distributed proportionally to the population in prefecture p if syndicate g operates there. To test the robustness to this assumption, we recalculate the share s pg based on another assumption: members of yakuza syndicate g are distributed proportionally to the population density (rather than population) if syndicate g operates there, and we refer to the concentration index based on this share s pg as YCI density p . In addition, we calculate the share s pg based on the assumption that members of yakuza syndicate g are distributed equally among all prefectures in which syndicate g operates, and we refer to the concentration index based on this share s pg as YCI naive p . Column (3): the Time-dependent YCI. In the main model (2), we do not include the main (non-interaction) term YCI p . As stated in the note below model (2), the inclusion of the main term YCI p may cause multicollinearity. Furthermore, the yakuza concentration indices YCI p are treated as time independent in order to mitigate reverse causality that may result from yakuza migration between prefectures with and without YEO.
To test the robustness of our results to these specification, we add the (time-dependent) main term YCI pt and replace time-independent YEO pt × YCI p with time-dependent YEO pt × YCI pt . As shown in Column (3), our results are robust to this specification. Note also that as we warn of multicollinearity, the estimated coefficient of the main term YCI pt has a very large standard error.
Column (4): Time Fixed Effects. In the main model, we include time (month times year) fixed effects ξ t . In contrast, we include month fixed effects and year fixed effects separately in Column (4). In this specification, we explicitly consider monthly and annual seasonality. Our results hold in this specification.
Columns (5)-(7): Estimation Methods. We test whether the results are robust to different estimators. In Column (5), we use the OLS estimation; thus, unlike in the main analysis, regressors are not weighted by prefecture population.
In Columns (6)- (7), we use PPML estimation. Regressors are weighted by prefecture population in Column (6) but not in Column (7). While PPML is robust to misspecification of the error term, it can be also used for continuous variables (e.g., the financial damages of money transfer scams in our case) (Wooldridge 2002) . The results of these specifications are qualitatively the same as those of the main model.
Column (8):
Amendment of Anti-yakuza Laws. Nationwide laws against the yakuza, which we call Anti-yakuza Laws (AYL), were amended in October 2012. We test whether our results are driven by the amendment of the AYL. The AYL treatment dummies AYL t equal 1 before the amendment and 0 after. We also include an interaction term AYL t × YCI p .
Interestingly, our evidence suggests that the main and interaction AYL terms do not have significant effects on yakuza membership or financial damages from money transfer scams. Only the coefficients of the main YEO term and interaction terms remain significant. Hence, this robustness check highlights the powerful effect of YEO.
Column (9): Executive Order 13581. Executive Order 13581, which was issued by the Obama administration, freezes the property of transnational criminal organizations, including the following four yakuza syndicates: Yamaguchi-gami, Sumiyoshi-kai, Inagawa-kai, and Kudo-kai. As this Executive Order was issued in April 2011, we add a treatment variable USEn f orcement t , which is equal to 1 after April 2011 and 0 otherwise. We also add an interaction term USEn f orcement t × YCI p , since the effect of the Executive Order may vary with the yakuza concentration. As shown in Column (9), the Executive Order hardly affects the regression results, and our results for the YEO effects hold.
Column (10): Tohoku Earthquake. Japan experienced the Tohoku Earthquake on March 11, 2011. It is often said that yakuza members engaged in business in the affected areas after the earthquake. For example, some of them participated in the repair of nuclear reactors that were damaged by the earthquake (Ramseyer 2015) and in the restoration of the affected areas. These economic opportunities might affect yakuza activities, but the main model does not take into account the effects of this earthquake. To check the robustness of our results, we exclude prefectures that were affected by this earthquake-Miyagi, Iwate, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Chiba, and Kanagawafrom our dataset. Using this new dataset, we obtain qualitatively the same results for the YEO effects. 
(8) 
Conclusion
We examine benefits and harms of the recent crackdown on Japanese organized crime syndicates, known as the yakuza, through YEO. This crackdown relies on third-party policing and aims to cut off flows of funding to yakuza syndicates. First, we examine the effects of YEO on yakuza membership. We find that YEO reduce yakuza membership and that the reduction is greater in prefectures where yakuza syndicates compete less intensively. Our conservative estimate implies that YEO account for roughly 40% of the recent reduction in yakuza membership. Our findings are consistent with the idea that yakuza members are less likely to resign from their syndicates in places with greater yakuza concentration. This idea makes sense because yakuza syndicates are considered to be motivated to maintain their numbers to gain advantages in turf wars.
Second, we study unintended effects of YEO. The sharp decrease in yakuza membership necessarily results in a sharp increase in the number of former yakuza members. Since they are less employable than good citizens because of their backgrounds, they struggle to find economic opportunities and are thus considered more likely to commit profitable crimes. We argue, therefore, that YEO might have had the side effect of increased profitable crime. Japan has recently experienced a sudden increase in the financial impact of money transfer scams. Indeed, we show that the total financial damages of this profitable crime have increased with the YEO enactment. YEO contribute to 30% of this rapid increase in financial damages. Moreover, we find that this side effect of YEO is larger in prefectures that are less yakuza infested. This finding is consistent with the result that YEO decrease yakuza membership in prefectures with less yakuza concentration.
Third, we provide evidence that both former and current yakuza members are involved in paying crimes such as money transfer scams.
Our first set of results shows that third-party policing can very effectively reduce the number of members of crime syndicates. At the same time, the second set of results suggests that third-party policing is not a panacea for public security, and it may increase some kinds of property crime. Organized crime is serious societal problem, but the literature on organized crime and its regulation is scant. This paper contributes the literature by discussing the benefits and harms of third-party policing.
